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In this manuscript we explore the onset of cooperative traits in the Public Goods game. This well-known game
involves N -agent interactions and thus reproduces a large number of social scenarios in which cooperation
appears to be essential. Many studies have recently addressed how the structure of the interaction patterns
influences the emergence of cooperation. Here we study how information about the payoffs collected by each
individual in the different groups it participates in, influences the decisions made by its group partners. Our
results point out that cross-information plays a fundamental and positive role in the evolution of cooperation for
different versions of the Public Goods game and different interaction structures.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 05.45.-a, 05.10.Gg
I. INTRODUCTION
While fundamental interactions of matter are of a pair-
wise nature, this is not, in general, the case for interactions
among constituents of biological, social or economical sys-
tems, where N -agent interactions could be as fundamental as
two-agent ones. Computational approaches aimed at model-
ing the dynamical aspects of these complex systems have tra-
ditionally paid much more attention to pairwise interactions,
but this could be in many instances an oversimplifying as-
sumption, in the extent that in general, group interactions are
not reducible to the aggregate of two-body interactions. For a
wide variety of issues and important questions in these kinds
of complex systems, a very successful formulation of the sys-
tem’s dynamics is that of evolutionary game dynamics [1–4],
where interaction among agents is modeled as a game, with
different possible strategies, from which agents receive pay-
offs and strategies spread over the population in proportion to
the payoff obtained, so implementing the (Darwinian) natural
selection of strategies.
In this paper we are concerned with the evolutionary game
dynamics of a particularly important (due to its applications to
biological [5–8] and socio-economical [9] systems) represen-
tative of the class of group interactions: the public goods game
(PGG). In this game, the agents can adopt one of two strate-
gies: Cooperation or Defection. Cooperators (also termed as
producers) contribute at their cost to the benefits of all mem-
bers of the group, while defectors (free riders) do not con-
tribute to the group welfare, but they enjoy benefits. In a gen-
eral setting of the PGG, both the cost paid by a cooperator,
ζ(ρC), and the benefit received by a group member, β(ρC),
are arbitrary functions of the fraction, 0 ≤ ρC ≤ 1, of co-
operators in the group, so that the net benefit of a cooper-
ator is PC = β(ρC) − ζ(ρC), while that of a free rider is
PD = β(ρC). In the realm of classical game theory (i.e.,
the analysis of decision-making by a rational agent), for a
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constant individual cooperation cost, ζ, and arbitrary convex
(or linear) benefit function, β(ρC), free riding is the rational
choice, though for concave functions β there are intervals of
ρC values for which the corresponding group composition is
a Nash equilibrium [10]. The most used payoff functions in
the literature, which are the ones that will be considered here-
after, are a constant cost ζ and a linear benefit β = rρC where
r > 0 is called the synergy or enhancement factor.
The simplest implementation of evolutionary dynamics
(well-mixed approximation) for the PGG (see for example
[11–13]) assumes that the N − 1 agents that form a group
with the focal player are randomly sampled without assort-
ment from an infinite population of cooperators and defectors
with an instantaneous fraction x = 〈ρC〉 of cooperators. In
this way, the probability that the focal player interacts with j
cooperators is fj(x) = CN−1j xj(1 − x)N−1−j and thus the
expected payoff of a defector focal player is:
WD(x) = N
−1
N−1∑
j=0
fj(x)rjζ , (1)
while for a cooperator focal player it reads:
WC(x) = WD(x) + rζN
−1 − ζ , (2)
that leads to the replicator equation for the evolution of the
expected value x of the fraction of cooperators:
x˙ = x(1 − x)[WC(x) −WD(x)] . (3)
From the WC and WD expressions above, one can easily see
that for r/N < 1 cooperation is asymptotically fixed in the
population, while if r/N > 1 defection dominates.
In order to go beyond the likely unrealistic assumption
of random grouping without any assortment, one can place
agents on the nodes of a graph (network) [14–18] and con-
sider that groups in which the PGG are played are defined as
neighborhoods of the nodes. In this way each agent partici-
pates in the group defined by its neighbors (and itself) and in
the groups defined as the neighborhoods of all its neighbors.
2For many different types of lattices and random networks, as
well as different implementations of evolutionary dynamics, it
is found that the kind of assortment introduced by the network
structure promotes cooperation in the sense that full cooper-
ation can be obtained for values of the enhancement factor
r < N , i.e., below the predictions of the well-mixed case.
Moreover, the structure of the network itself seems to have
an important influence for the promotion of cooperation so
that scale-free (SF) networks, for which the probability P (k)
that a node has k neighbors follows a power-lawP (k) ∼ k−γ ,
show the smallest value of the enhancement factor r for which
cooperation is obtained [16].
Another step further in the implementation of the evolu-
tionary dynamics of the PGG have been recently proposed in
[19–21]. In these works, the actual structure of social groups
is taken into account, thus getting rid off the above assumption
considering that groups are formed by each node together with
its neighbors. In fact, this assumption is somewhat unrealistic
as it does not reflect the social structure of groups as revealed,
for example, by real collaboration networks [22–24]. To in-
corporate the group structure into the formulation of the PGG
in [19–21] the authors make use of bipartite graphs. In a bipar-
tite graph there are two different types of nodes representing
respectively, in the case of the PGG, agents and groups. In
this way, the edges are restricted to connect nodes of a differ-
ent type, so that an agent is linked to the groups it participates
in, and correspondingly a group is linked to its forming mem-
bers. It is important to stress that, unlike the previous net-
worked settings, the size of the groups and the agent’s degree
(i.e., the number of groups it belongs to) are here disentan-
gled so that an agent i interacting with ki neighbors is not
forced to interact with all of them simultaneously in a single
group. Therefore, the bipartite formulation allows to study,
e.g., different types of probability densities for the number of
connections of the agents and for the number of elements of
the groups. In particular, in [19, 20] it is shown that the use of
realistic patterns of connections for agents and groups leads to
an increase of the cooperation with respect of the aforemen-
tioned case of scale-free networks. In brief, the recent works
on the evolutionary dynamics of the PGG (see [25] for a recent
comprehensive review) have tried to explain the emergence of
cooperation by incorporating the actual structure of group in-
teractions relying on real data about social and collaboration
networks.
In this paper, following the avenue of encoding the group
interaction of the PGG in a bipartite network, we aim at study-
ing the role that information about the payoffs of the agents
has on the dissemination of cooperative traits in the PGG.
A general underlying assumption in the previously reported
studies on the evolutionary dynamics of PGG on bipartite net-
works is that the fitness of individuals is the simple sum of the
payoffs received from all the games in which they participate.
Thus when each agent i compares their fitness with another
agent j in the same group, i is aware of the benefits obtained
by j in all the groups it participates, regardless of whether or
not i also participates in these groups. In other words, it is
assumed not only that a perfect information is available, but
also that the whole information from all the groups j partic-
ipates in is equally relevant for the decission of agent i. To
analyze the role that perfect or partial information about the
fitness of individuals has on their decision and the long-term
success of cooperation, we introduce a parameter 0 < α < 1
to quantify the relevance that payoffs obtained by an individ-
ual in other groups has in its effective fitness relative to the
group in which the strategy update takes place. Our results
show that perfect information is essential for the development
of cooperative traits in structured populations.
The paper is structure as follows. In the next section II we
introduce in detail the bipartite structure of the population,
the specifics of the evolutionary dynamics employed, and the
computational details that we have used in the numerical sim-
ulations. In section III we show and discuss the results ob-
tained. Finally, we present some conclusions in section IV.
II. THE MODEL
A. The structure of interactions
As introduced before we consider a population of N agents
that interacts within NG groups as dictated by a bipartite
graph. In this way each agent i belongs to ki (kmin ≤ ki ≤
kmax) groups, whereas a group g containsGg (Gmin ≤ Gg ≤
Gmax) agents. We assume that there is no internal structure
inside each group. In order to characterize the interaction pat-
terns between individuals and groups it is common to consider
the degree distribution of the agents P (k) and the size distri-
bution P (G) of the groups. By fixing P (k) and P (G) one can
construct random bipartite graphs so that each particular real-
ization of the graph is specified by a (NG × N) membership
matrix A defined as Ag,i = 1 whenever i ∈ g, or Ag,i = 0
otherwise. GivenA it is easy to express the number of groups,
ki, the agent i takes part in as:
ki =
NG∑
g=1
ag,i (i = 1, ..., N) , (4)
and the number of participants, Gg , contained in group g, as:
Gg =
N∑
i=1
ag,i (g = 1, ..., Ng) . (5)
Let us note that, in finite populations, not all the combi-
nations of P (k) and P (G) are compatible. In particular, the
total number of links in the bipartite graph is the same no mat-
ter how they are computed considering either the agents or
the groups. This latter closure condition yields the following
identity:
N∑
i=1
ki =
NG∑
g=1
Gg ⇒ N
∑
k
P (k)k = NG
∑
G
P (G)G ,
(6)
that automatically sets a compatibility condition for the degree
and group size distribution densities. This fact introduces a
constraint in (at least) one of the two distributions P (k) and
P (G) as we will see below.
3B. The Public Goods Game in bipartite graph
Now we go over the nature of agents’ interactions as play-
ers of a PGG. Each group is the scenario of a PGG, and all the
groups share the same rules for the game, which implies that
there is a common enhancement factor r for all PGGs. In this
paper an agent i at time t adopts the same action (to cooperate
C or to free ride D) on all the different ki groups it belongs to.
At each dynamical step t, we characterize the internal state
of each agent i by the strategic variable si(t), which can take
two possible values: 1 if i cooperates, or 0 when the agent
free rides. This strategic variable, together with the mem-
bership matrix A that fixes the social structure, completely
specifies the instantaneous microscopic state of the popula-
tion. According to this, the fraction of cooperators in group g
(g = 1, ..., NG) at time t is given by:
xg(t) =
1
Gg
∑
i∈g
si(t) , (7)
whereas its average value over the groups,
x¯(t) =
1
NG
∑
g
xg(t) , (8)
defines the instantaneous average group cooperation. In gen-
eral, the value x¯(t) is different from the fraction of cooperators
at time t:
c(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
si(t) . (9)
On the other hand, the value:
ca(t) =
∑N
i=1 kisi(t)∑N
i=1 ki
=
∑NG
g=1Ggxg(t)∑NG
g=1 Gg
, (10)
represents the fraction of cooperative actions averaged over
all the agents and PGGs in which they participate. Note that
for general P (k) and P (G) compatible densities, the three
averages x¯(t), c(t), and ca(t) need not be equal, the reason
being that the contribution of each particular agent might be
weighted differently.
Here we will consider two possible formulations for assign-
ing the value of the investment made in each of the PGGs in
which an agent participates. On one hand, we study a fixed
cost per game (FCG) formulation so that each cooperator i in-
vests a fixed cost ci = ζ = 1 in each of the ki games it partic-
ipates in. On the other hand, we will also consider the formu-
lation of fixed cost per individual (FCI) according to which, a
cooperator i equally distributes its total investment ζ among
all its groups, so that the agent invests ci = ζ/ki = 1/ki in
each PGG. In both cases, the total contribution of all cooper-
ators in a group is multiplied by an enhancement factor r and
the result is equally distributed between all the Gg members
of the group.
According to the FCG formulation, each player i receives a
payoff:
pig,i(t) = rxg(t)− si(t) , (11)
from its participation in a group g and, otherwise, according
to the FCI formulation it receives:
pig,i(t) =
r
∑
j∈g sj(t)/kj
Gg
− si(t)k
−1
i . (12)
Given an agent i and a group g of which it is a member, the
effective fitness of agent i relative to group g is defined as
pieffg,i (t) = pig,i(t) + α
NG∑
g′=1
(Ag′,i − δg′,g) · pig′,i(t) , (13)
where δg′,g = 1 when g′ = g and δg′,g = 0 otherwise. The
parameter α ∈ [0, 1] in the above expression quantifies the
amount of information shared between groups. In particular,
the higher α, the more information is shared, so that α = 0
corresponds to the extreme case in which each agent’s effec-
tive fitness relative to a given group uses only the information
on payoffs in this group. On the other hand, for α = 1 agents
have full information about payoffs from other groups.
C. The evolutionary Dynamics
Once all the PGGs have been played in the groups and the
corresponding payoffs have been collected by the individuals
the evolutionary dynamics takes place. In this work we con-
sider the Fermi Rule as the strategic update framework for the
evolutionary dynamics [26, 27]. In this way, at each time step
t, each agent i chooses a random group g among all its groups
and a random partner, say j, of the chosen group g, and com-
pares their effective fitness relative to group g. Agent i will
imitate the action of j, (si(t+ 1) = sj(t)), with a probability
given by a Fermi function of the effective fitness difference:
Pi→j =
1
1 + exp(−β(pieffg,j (t)− pi
eff
g,i (t)))
, (14)
where β is a constant often interpreted as the inverse tem-
perature of the system, i.e., the higher temperature, the more
random is imitation and thus, the more smoothly dependent
on the differences of effective fitness (payoffs).
III. RESULTS
In order to study the influence of the information exchange
between groups in the evolution of cooperation we have con-
sidered two different scenarios. In the first one, all the groups
have the same size Gg = G, while the connectivity of the
agents (i.e., the number of groups to which they belong) varies
from one to another being distributed according to a power
law, i.e., the probability for an agent i to participate in ki
groups is given by P (ki) = Ck−γi , for certain constants C, γ.
In the second scenario, we have fixed the agents’ connectivity
ki = k and distributed the group size according to a power
law, being the probability P (Gg) for a given group g to have
Gg members: P (Gg) = C′G−γ
′
g .
4The two scenarios described above, along with the FCG and
FCI formulations of PGG, provide four combinations that we
have separately studied through numerical simulations. In the
first scenario, the connectivity of the agents is given by:
P (ki) = Ck
−γ
i =
(
kmax∑
k=kmin
k−γ
)−1
k−γi , (15)
where kmin and kmax are, respectively, the minimum and
maximum possible connectivities. In addition, the condition
(6), which here takes the form 〈k〉N = GNG, implies:
C =
GNG
N
∑kmax
k=kmin
k1−γ
(16)
and therefore: ∑kmax
k=kmin
k−γ∑kmax
k=kmin
k1−γ
=
N
GNG
, (17)
that provides the value of exponent γ once the network param-
eters N,NG, G, kmin and kmax are fixed. Let us note that in
this first scenario the instantaneous group cooperation, equa-
tion (8), coincides with the fraction of cooperative actions,
equation (10), x¯(t) = ca(t) .
Alternatively, in the second scenario the size of the groups
is given by:
P (Gg) = C
′G−γ
′
g =
(
Gmax∑
G=Gmin
G−γ
′
)−1
G−γ
′
g , (18)
where Gmin and Gmax are, respectively, the minimum and
maximum possible sizes. Equation (6) introduces a constraint
for the group size distribution density P (Gg), and the analo-
gous to expression (17) takes the form:∑Gmax
G=Gmin
G−γ
′
∑Gmax
G=Gmin
G1−γ′
=
NG
kN
. (19)
Finally, let us note that in the second scenario the fraction
of cooperators, equation (9), coincides with the fraction of
cooperative actions, equation (10), c(t) = ca(t) .
We simulated the evolutionary dynamics of PGG, starting
from an initial condition according to which the fraction of co-
operators approximately equals the number of free-riders and
both strategists are randomly distributed. For each value of
the normalized enhancement factor r/〈G〉, we iterate a large
number of rounds (105) and measure the average fraction c
of cooperators averaged over a time window of 104 additional
rounds. In addition, we reported the values once overaged
over 102 different networks -membership matrices- and ini-
tial conditions. The number of groups and agents were both
fixed to NG = N = 103. After the random assignation of the
agents’ connectivities according to the distribution given by
formula (15) for the first scenario (or, respectively, the group
sizes following the distribution given by (18) for the second
scenario) we implemented the network following a configura-
tional model. The minimum size was fixed to Gmin = 2 in
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Average fraction of cooperators 〈c〉, as a func-
tion of the normalized enhacement factor r/〈G〉, for a SF distribu-
tion of the membership frequency ki (i.e., number of groups to which
an agent belongs), and a fixed group size Gg = 10. Different pan-
els correspond to different values of the parameter α that models
the inter-groups information exchange: α = 1 corresponds to the
case in which agents have full information about their partners’ pay-
offs, while for α = 0 agents only have knowledge of payments from
their games. Solid red lines correspond to the FCG formulation of
the PGG, while dashed blue lines correspond to the FCI version.
Results are averaged over 102 realizations (and different member-
ship matrices) for each value of r/〈G〉. Other parameter values are
N = NG = 10
3
, β = 0.1, ζ = 1.
order to avoid one-player games; likewise, the minimum con-
nectivity was also fixed to kmin = 2 to allow comparisons be-
tween scenarios. Maximum size and connectivity were fixed
to Gmax = kmax = 32, implying C = C′ ≃ 0.3399 and
γ = γ′ ≃ 1.020 (these values were numerically calculated).
Regarding the first scenario, in which we have fixed the size
of the groups to G = 10 and distributed the connectivity of
the agents according to a power law, Fig. 1 shows the average
fraction 〈c〉 of cooperators [28] as a function of the normal-
ized enhancement factor r/G for the PGG, according to the
FCG (solid red lines) and to the FCI (dashed blue lines) for-
mulations, for a value of the parameter β = 0.1. Each panel in
Fig. 1 corresponds to a different value of the inter-groups in-
formation exchange parameter α, from α = 1 (left top panel)
which corresponds to the case in which perfect global infor-
mation about partners’ payoffs is available to the agents, to
α = 0 (right bottom panel) where effective fitness of agents
only depends on local information. As it can be observed,
there exists a critical value rc/G at which a phase transition
takes place. The main finding is that the value rc/G increases
with decreasing α, which means that global information plays
a positive role in the evolution of cooperation. In fact, while
the transition to cooperative states take place at rc/G ≃ 0.9
for the FCG formulation (resp., rc/G ≃ 0.7 for FCI) when
α = 1, this critical value increases as we decrease the param-
eter α and, finally, no transition occurs for α = 0.
5The absence of a transition to a cooperative regime for
α = 0 (when the effective fitness of an individual relative
to a group is just its payoff from this group) can be easily
understood: the benefit obtained by an agent from a single
group pig,i, see equations (11) and (12), is always higher for
a free rider than for a cooperator in the same group, irrespec-
tive of the formulation (FCG or FCI) used, and of the value of
the normalized enhancement factor r/G. Then, for strategy
updating rules based on fitness differences, the bias in the im-
itation probability against cooperators forces always the evo-
lutionary fixation of free riders in the long term, and the tran-
sition cannot take place. We thus clearly see that a value of
α > 0 is indeed a prerequisite for the eventual existence of a
cooperative regime. Once this condition is satisfied, the role
of those individuals that participate in many games (hubs) in
promoting the cooperative transition is, in the scenario of fig-
ure 1, an important issue, as in other different previously stud-
ied settings for the evolutionary dynamics of PGG [16, 20] as
well as of two-person games [29–32]. Briefly said, hubs (ei-
ther cooperators or free riders) collect very high payoffs and
are neighbors of many agents, and so they are easily imitated
by individuals in their (many) groups. However, while the
imitation of free rider hubs decreases their future benefits (a
source of future instability), just the opposite happens to co-
operator hubs when imitated by partners (stability increases).
On the other hand, comparing the results obtained with both
formulations, one observes that the FCI version presents lower
values of rc than those corresponding to FCG, which means
that the FCI formulation promotes better the convergence to
cooperative states for any value of α that enables the transi-
tion. This is due to the fact that in the FCG formulation coop-
erators pay according to their connectivity (the more games,
the higher the cost), while in the FCI version cooperators pay
a fixed cost regardless of the number of PGG in which they
participate. This independence of the cost of cooperation (in-
vestment) on connectivity provides cooperators, and specially
cooperator hubs, higher payoffs in the FCI formulation, and
the survival of cooperation is consequently enhanced [20].
Figure 2 represents the results for the second scenario, in
which all the agents have the same connectivity k = 10
(i.e., all the agents participate in exactly 10 games) and the
group size distribution P (Gg) follows a power law P (Gg) =
C′G−γ
′
g . The four panels show the asymptotic average frac-
tion 〈c〉 of cooperators versus the normalized enhancement
factor r/〈G〉 for different values of the parameter α, from
α = 1 (left top panel, full payoff information available) to
α = 0 (right bottom panel, pay-off information restricted to
the focal group). Note that the argument given above showing
that no cooperative regime exists for α = 0, is also valid in
this second scenario. For α > 0 however, as there are no hubs
here, a different mechanism for the possibility of a coopera-
tive regime must be invoked. If one thinks of the situation in
which all the groups have the same fraction xg < 1 of co-
operators, one easily realizes that every free rider earns more
effective fitness than any cooperator, which will, in the long
term suppress cooperation. In other words, fluctuations of xg
among the different groups seems to be needed for the evo-
lutionary success of cooperation. Let us remember that in the
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average fraction of cooperators 〈c〉, as a func-
tion of the normalized enhacement factor r/〈G〉, when the size of the
groups Gg are distributed according to a power-law and all the agents
belong to the same number of groups ki = 10. Different panels cor-
respond to different values of the inter-groups information exchange
ratio, from α = 1 (maximum) to α = 0 (minimum). Solid lines
red are for the FCG formulation, while dashed blue lines are for the
FCI version. Results are averaged over 102 realizations performed in
different networks. Other parameter are equal as those used in Fig. 1.
initial condition the strategies are randomly distributed among
the agents, and that the scale-free distribution of group sizes
makes small groups abundant in this scenario. It is precisely
among small groups where the likelihood of an initial frac-
tion 1 of cooperators is largest. The high payoffs received
by these cooperators from the small-sized fully cooperative
groups makes plausible, provided α > 0, that they could both
resist invasion from free riders and spread cooperation at up-
dating trials in the larger groups they participate in.
In Fig. 2, almost no difference is observed in the results ob-
tained for both (FCG and FCI) formulations, a feature that (at
a first sight) could be explained because now all the players
are involved in the same number of games, and so the rela-
tive benefits of strategists do not vary from one to the other
formulation. However, see below (at the end of this section)
for a more precise argument that takes into account the role of
β and reveals the weakness of this first explanation. On the
other hand, by comparing Figs. 1 and 2, it can be seen that for
high and intermediate values of α the critical value of the en-
hancement factor rc in the second scenario with non-uniform
group sizes is higher than on the first one with heterogeneous
connectivity, which shows the effectiveness of the role of hubs
in promoting cooperation provided that players are aware of
their partners’ payments from outside the focal group.
The influence of the inter-groups information exchange on
the evolution of cooperation is more clearly shown in Fig. 3
where we show the critical value rc/〈G〉 of the normalized
enhancement factor versus the value of the inter-groups infor-
mation exchange parameter α, for FCG and FCI formulations
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α
1
10
r c
 
/<
G
> FCG
FCI
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
α
1
10
r c
 
/<
G
> FCI
FCG
heterogeneous
 membership
 heterogeneous
   group sizes
FIG. 3: (Color online) Critical value rc/〈G〉 of the normalized en-
hacement factor as a function of the inter-groups information ex-
change ratio α for the FCG and FCI formulations of the PGG. Left
panel corresponds to a SF distribution of the number of groups to
which an agent belongs, ki, and a fixed group size Gg = 10. Right
panels corresponds to the case in which the group size distribution
(P (Gg)) follows a power-law while all the agents belong to the same
number of groups ki = 10. Other parameter are equal as those used
in Fig. 1.
and both scenarios considered: a fixed group size G = 10
in the left panel and a fixed connectivity k = 10 in the right
panel. On the one hand, it can be noticed the abrupt nature
of the dependence: while for high values of α the curve is
smooth and rc/〈G〉 does not present a strong dependence on
α, for α ≃ 0 a small decrease of α implies a very large in-
crease of rc. This fact indicates that only a small information
exchange is enough to trigger the emergence of cooperation.
On the other hand, as it has been previously mentioned, when
the distribution of the number of groups, ki, to which an agent
i belongs is heterogeneous (left panel), the FCI formulation
presents lower values of the critical value rc for any value of
α > 0 than the FCG version and therefore a higher tendency
to cooperative states; on the contrary, when the group size dis-
tribution P (Gg) follows a power-law and all the agents par-
ticipate in the same number of games, ki = 10, the FCG and
FCI curves match which indicates that the critical value rc is
robust against the choice of formulation.
All the previous shown results have been calculated for a
particular value of the parameter β = 0.1, where 1/β mim-
ics somehow the temperature of the system: the higher tem-
perature the more random is imitation and thus less depen-
dent on the difference of effective fitness. At variance with
other updating rules, as e.g., discrete replicator or imitate the
best, whose dynamics very often reaches stationary states of
strategic coexistence, the ”trembling hand” mechanism that
the Fermi rule incorporates through β has the effect that wher-
ever it has been used, evolution seems to end up in absorbing
mono-strategic states. This is in fact the case in the first sce-
nario, so that those situations in Fig. 1 where 0 < 〈c〉 < 1
means that the fraction of realizations ending up in a fully co-
operative absorbing stat is 〈c〉. However, this is no longer the
case when P (Gg) follows a power-law and all the agents par-
ticipate in k = 10 games. In other words, a value 0 < 〈c〉 < 1
of the average fraction of cooperators in Fig. 2, corresponds
to states of true strategic coexistence in the realizations.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Average fraction of cooperators 〈c〉 versus
the normalized enhacement factor r/〈G〉 for different values of the
parameter β corresponding to the inverse temperature of the system
(i.e., the lower β, the more random is imitation), when the group size
distribution P (Gg) follows a power-law and all the agents belong
to the same number of groups ki = 10. Left panel corresponds to
the FCG formulation of the PGG, while right panel corresponds to
the FCI one. Results are averaged over 102 realizations performed in
different networks. Other parameter are equal as those used in Fig. 1.
We show in Fig. 4 the asymptotic average fraction of co-
operators 〈c〉 as a function of r/〈G〉 for different values of
the parameter β, for the second scenario, full information
(α = 1), and for both formulations: left panel corresponds
to the FCG formulation while right panel corresponds to the
FCI version. As it can be seen, while for high values of the
temperature (i.e., low values of β) the transition is abrupt, with
a sharp shift from the uncooperative state c = 0 to the fully
cooperative state c = 1, for low values of the temperature the
transition is smooth. This is due to the fact that, according to
equation (14), at low temperatures the imitation probability as
a function of the difference of effective fitness is very close to
a step function (no imitation unless other’s fitness is higher),
and therefore the probability to get stuck in metastable non-
absorbing states with 0 < c < 1 is higher than for high tem-
perature, where the likelihood for players to imitate partners
with lower benefits is greater, so allowing the dynamics to ex-
plore wider regions of the space of configurations and to find
a way out to an absorbing state.
The comparison of panels in Fig. 4 reveals a remarkable
similarity of both set of curves, despite the fact that for high
β individual curves clearly differs from panel to panel. This
observation has a crystal clear explanation from the analysis
of equations (11) to (14). In the second scenario, where all
agents have the same connectivity, for every given strategic
configuration, and irrespective of the value of α, the effective
fitness of all the agents are simply multiplied by a constant
factor k when changing from the FCI formulation to the FCG
one. Thus, from equation (14), all the transition probabilities
between configurations for the FCI formulation at a value β
are exactly those for the FCG one at a value β/k. Note that
this argument further modifies the explanation given above for
the almost coincidence observed in the behavior of the curves
〈c〉 vs. r/〈G〉 for FCI and FCG formulations in Fig.2, in the
sense that this coincidence is due to the small value of β = 0.1
used there; larger values of β would have revealed stronger
differences nearby the transition, that nonetheless do not af-
fect the location of the critical values rc/〈G〉.
7IV. CONCLUSIONS.
It is well known that for the study of the evolution of coop-
eration in most real systems is of utmost importance to deal
with N-agents interactions as well as to take into account the
details of the group structure in which interactions take place.
Recently, several mechanisms have been suggested for ex-
plaining the onset of cooperative behavior in the PGG by con-
sidering bipartite graphs. In this kind of graphs it is possible
to reproduce the assortment of individuals in groups with dis-
tribution of sizes according to that observed in real systems.
In this paper, by exploiting the bipartite framework, we have
considered the role that information exchange between groups
has on the emergence of cooperation in the PGG. In particular,
we have studied how the knowledge of the payoff collected by
an individual in all the groups it belongs to affect the decision
of those individuals interacting with it in a single group.
Our results point out that cross-information plays a fun-
damental and positive role in the evolution of cooperation.
Moreover, by tuning a parameter quantifying the interchange
of information between groups we have observed that the in-
fluence of this latter ingredient is highly nonlinear: a small
amount of information exchange is enough to promote coop-
eration to the levels previously observed in bipartite graphs.
Let us note that the limit in which no information interchange
is allowed is similar to the well mixed scenario, in which co-
operation is not observed unless the enhancement factor r is
larger than the typical size of the groups.
Furthermore, by comparing setups with either a heteroge-
nous distribution for the connectivity of the agents (combined
with a homogeneous distribution for the size of the groups)
or a heterogeneous distribution for the sizes of groups (com-
bined with a homogeneous distribution for the agents connec-
tivities), we have shown that systems with heterogeneous con-
nectivities for the agents converge to cooperative states for
lower values of the enhancement factor r, thus displaying the
role of hubs in promoting cooperation in PGGs. In addition,
within this latter setup, the FCI framework (in which coopera-
tors pay a fixed cost regardless the number of groups they be-
long to) presents lower values of the critical enhancement fac-
tor rc than those corresponding to FCG setting (in which the
cost of a cooperator is proportional to the number of groups
it belongs to) due to the higher benefits of cooperator hubs in
the FCI setup. Nevertheless, when the group size distribution
is heterogeneous and all the agents belong to the same number
of groups, both the FCG and the FCI version of the PGG show
roughly the same behavior.
Summarizing, our results show that the exchange of infor-
mation between groups enhances the cooperation in intercon-
nected populations, highlighting the idea that a collaborative
attitude in systems composed of many local groups can be fos-
tered by facilitating the ways of communication beyond single
work teams.
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